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WARTIME DESTRUCTION OF PREMISES-EFFECT UPON
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
THE impact of modern warfare, particularly aerial bombardment, has
brought into sharp focus the anachronistic common law rules on landlord
and tenant liability for rent and repair of destroyed premises. As part of
a series of acts' recognizing that war is a national venture and that resultant
war damage should be borne by the nation rather than by the individual,
the British have made sweeping changes in their law on the subject. Although
the probability of wholesale destruction of American buildings and homes
is not considered great, nevertheless the possible consequences of total war
necessitate a similarly realistic modification of our landlord and tenant law.
The problem may be divided into two phases: (1) liability to repair or
rebuild premises destroyed by an act of God or the public enemy; (2) lia-
bility to pay rent for premises so destroyed.
THE COMMON LAW RULES
Liability to Rebuild. Complete agreement does not exist in the United
States on the common law rule regarding liability to rebuild fortuitously
destroyed premises.2 Since there is usually no express provision in leases to
cover such destruction, the question turns on the interpretation of the usual
covenants for upkeep of the premises. A few states hold the tenant liable
to rebuild when he has merely agreed to "surrender the premises in as good
condition as received at the beginning of the term." Other jurisdictions hold
the tenant liable only if he has covenanted to "keep the premises in repair,
fair wear and tear by the elements excepted."' 3 Still other states construe
"repair" to mean "to amend, not to make a new thing but to refit, to make
good or restore an existing thing," and so relieve the tenant from any obli-
gation to restore demolished property.
4
1. See Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Gao. VI, c. 67; Housing
(Emergency Powers) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 73; Essential Buildings and Plant
(Repair of War Damage) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 73; War Damage Act, 1941,
4 & 5 Gao. VI, c. 12; Liabilities (War Time Adjustment) Act, 1941, 4 & 5 Geo. VI, c.
29; Repair of War Damage Act, 1941, 4 & 5 GEo. VI, c. 34.
2. See Notes (1893) 22 L. R. A. 613, (1926) 45 A. L. R. 12, (1933) 84 A. L. R.
393.
3. The cases are collected in 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed, 1939) § 103. See es-
pecially Black v. LaPorte, 271 Fed. 620 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921). The landlord is under no
duty to keep the leased premises in repair in the absence of an express covenant to do
so. 1 TiFFANY, loc. cit. supra. But a general covenant by the landlord to repair includes
the duty to rebuild in case of the destruction of the premises by fire or the elements.
Note (1924) 28 A. L. R. 1535.
4. Heart of America Lumber Co. v. Belove, 111 F. (2d) 535 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940)
Saylor v. Brooks, 114 Kan. 493, 220 Pac. 193 (1923) ; Wattles v. South Omaha Ice and
Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 69 N. V. 785 (1897) ; see Decker, Duties of A Tenant to Rebuild
After He Has Covenanted to Repair (1940) 6 IowA BAR Ray. 52.
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There is, of course, a wealth of precedent available when premises are
destroyed by fire, flood, lightning, or other act of God. But since most of
our wars have been fought on foreign soil, there are no recent exact prece-
dents to be applied in case of destruction of property by the military action
of the public enemy.5 The leading American case, Pollard v. ShaffcrO is a
product of the Revolutionary period. There the British Army had taken
possession of and committed certain acts of waste on leased premises in
Pennsylvania. The tenant was held not liable to restore the property even
though he had covenanted to deliver it up at the end of the term in good
repair. The rationale of the court was that since such loss was not within
the contemplation of either party, any covenant to repair "against an act
of God or an enemy, ought to be special and e:ipress, and so clear that no
other meaning could be put upon it." The case law in England has been
scarcely more numerous and much less favorable to the tenant. In the
leading and most recent case, Redmond v. Dainton,s a tenant, because he
had covenanted to repair, was held liable for the reconstruction of premises
destroyed by an enemy bomb dropped from an airplane during World War I.
Liability for Rent. At common law the tenant was liable, when the
premises were destroyed, for the payment of rent until the end of the term
of his lease.9 Several policy considerations were advanced in justification
of the rule. Since the loss had occurred through no fault of either the land-
lord or the tenant, and since the landlord had to bear the loss of the property
(in most jurisdictions at least), it seemed only equitable that the tenant bear
a share of the total loss by continuing to pay rent. The tenant, being in
possession, was in a better position, theoretically at any rate, to prevent
damage by fire, flood, wind, or the public enemy. And, finally, it was feared
that to release the tenant would induce less vigilance on his part and encour-
age him to destroy the premises as a means of escaping from a lease that
had become undesirable.' 0
5. Early cases are Harrison v. 'Myer, 92 U. S. 111 (1876); Pollard v. Shater, 1
Dall. 210 (Pa. 1787); Bayly v. Lawrence, 1 Bay. 499 (S. C. 1774); Coogan v. Par-
ker, 2 S. C. (N.s.) 255 (1870).
6. 1 Dall. 210 (Pa. 1787).
7. Id. at 215. But the tenant, nevertheless, was held liable for rent on the theory
that, because he would have had the advantage of "casual" profits, he ought likevise
to bear the risk of "casual" loss.
8. [1920] 2 V. B. 256.
9. See 3 TiFFAxy, op. cit. supra note 3, §905; TiFF .-,Y, RE., Pnorzr (1940)
§ 117; REsTATraImE, CoNrTAcrs (1932) § 290, illustration 2; Notes (1911) 33 L. R. A.
(mns.) 540, (1939) 118 A. L. R. 106, (1942) 137 A. L. R. 1199, 1224. See also Coogan
v. Parker, 2 S. C. (iNs.) 255 (1870), and the following more recent cases: Gamble-
Robinson Co. v. Buzzard, 65 F. (2d) 950 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933); De Mund v. Oro Grande
Consolidated Mines, 56 Ariz. 45S, 108 P. (2d) 770 (1941); Davis v. Shepperd, 1%6 Ar:.
302, 117 S. V. (2d) 337 (193S); Sigal v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 153 Adt. S91 (1932);
Abrams v. Simon, 243 Ky. 773, 49 S. W. (2d) 1031 (1932); Barry v. Herring, 153 Md.
457, 138 Adt. 266 (1927); Finnegan v. McGavock, 230 W ,is. 112, 283 N. W. 321 (1939).
10. See TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) § 182m(1).
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The legal rationale is clearly expressed in Paradine v. Jane1" (1647), the
origin of this common law doctrine. There it was said that the tenant's express
covenant to pay rent ought to be strictly construed against him since he
might have provided against liability in the event of such a contingency.
Moreover, under the common law approach, a lease was regarded as an
estate for years with the lessee acquiring a definite interest in the land
demised. Though buildings might remain no more, the land still existed
and presumably continued useful to the tenant for some purpose or other.
Since something was left to which the lease could attach, there was no failure
of consideration.
12
In an agrarian economy a long term lease of land to tenants for farming
purposes could well be thought of as the sale of a particular kind of estate
in land for a number of years, with payment of the purchase price at agreed
intervals. But this agricultural lease, which determined even one's social
standing, has been replaced by the business lease, which is thought of as
a formal contract for the use and enjoyment of premises. In this situation,
enforcement of the common law rule is distinctly anachronistic.
Realizing this fact, most states have struggled against the obvious injustice
of the antiquated rule which binds the tenant to pay rent for something
which does not exist. A number of states have sought to relieve the tenant
by statutes which permit him to disclaim the lease if the subject matter is
destroyed.' 3 The courts of those states, however, have shown a tendency
to narrow such statutes. 14 Their effectiveness is impaired also because they
do not operate to prevent the parties from covenanting privately regarding
the fortuitous destruction of the leasehold.', This statutory hiatus is espe-
cially serious in view of the fact that the tenant is more often than not in
an inferior bargaining position. As one writer comments: "Even the coin-
mon forms of lease sold by the law stationers are little more than traps for
the unwary, ingeniously drafted in the landlord's interest." 10
Among the state courts, some have ignored the doctrine that a lease is
an interest in land, and have released the tenant by applying the contract
principles of "frustration" and "impossibility" to discharge the parties from
their promises.' 7 Courts in other states have reached the desired result by
a strict enforcement of a landlord's covenant to repair.' 8 Finally, some
11. [1647] Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897.
12. See 6 WILLIsXOr, CoNTAcRs (1938) § 1955.
13. See (1928) 13 IowA L. Rzv. 330, n. 9.
14. See TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1940) § 117, n. 43; Note (1893) 22 L. R. A. 613;
(1928) 13 IowA L. Rav. 328, 330, n. 9.
15. Stieffen v. Darling, 158 Va. 375, 163 S. E. 353 (1932).
16. Lloyd, The Disturbed Tenant-A Phase of Construtclive Eviction (1931) 79
U. OF PA. L. REv. 707.
17. See 6 WILLISTON, tOC. cit. supra note 12, n. 10; RESTATEtENT, CONTRACTS (1932)
§ 458.
18. Piper v. Fletcher, 115 Iowa 263, 88 N. W. 380 (1901) ; see Note (1924) 28 A.
L. R. 1448, 1477.
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states apportion the loss where real and personal property are leased for a
gross rental and the personalty is a substantial part of the leased property;
upon total destruction the rent is abated in proportion to the rental value
of the personalty.19
When apartment leases are involved, conceptual necessity has forced modi-
fication of the common law doctrine in practically all American courts'-°3
The apartment tenant bargains for no interest in the land supporting the
building, and so the land forms no part of the consideration for the lease.
The only interest the tenant has in the land is a right of support in the
nature of an easement, and when the room is destroyed, the easement is
extinguished. The common law rule had to be abandoned in this situation
for the very practical reason that tenants of different stories could not possibly
retain possession of the soil under their respective apartments in the event
of the apartment building's destruction. Despite these considerations, the
English courts insist upon applying the orthodox doctrine to apartment
houses.2' And even in America the common law rule is followed when
a whole building is leased, however incongruous such a distinction might
appear.22 For suppose X, as the lessee of a whole building, subleases all
but one floor to Y. If the premises are destroyed in wartime, X and Y are
equally innocent; yet under the doctrine followed by most American courts
Y would be relieved of paying rent, while X would remain bound.P There
is little consolation for X in the knowledge that he can use the cellar of the
destroyed building for a victory garden.
The common law, however, has never permitted the application of the
reasonable rule of the civil law. Under the latter concept the enjoyment of the
thing leased is the correlative of the rental contracted to be paid; - and so,
unless the tenant stipulates in the lease to assume the risk25 the lease is
at an end in case of total destruction by an unforeseen event 2 The wisdom
of the civil law approach is even more apparent in wartime when the parties
19. See Note (1939) 118 A. L. R. 106, 116.
20. See 3 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 905, n. 41; Note (1893) 22 L. R. A. 613.
Representative is White v. Stelle, 33 S. IV. (2d) 224 (Te-. Civ. App. 1930).
21. See 3 TIFFAxY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 905, n. 42.
22. Ibid.
23. See (1924) 11 VA. L. REv. 56, 58.
24. In contrast, the common law approach wmas to regard the tenant's covenant to
pay rent and the landlord's covenant of quiet enjoyment or of repair as completely inde-
pendent and mutually exclusive promises. Thus the tenant might not set up the breach
of a landlord's covenant to repair as a defense for rent if he remained in possession. He
would have to pay the rent and then sue to recover damages for the landlord's breach
of covenant. To prevent such ex-travagant circuity of action, modem courts have resorted
to the theory of constructive eviction, thereby embracing contract principles while talk-
ing in real property language. See Bennett, Tz 3Modens Leasc-An Estate in Land or a
Contract (1937) 16 TFx. L. REv. 47, 68; Smith, Impossibility of Performance as an Ex-
cuse in French Law: The Doctrine of Force Majenre (1936) 45 Ymza I. J. 452, 457.
25. Viterbo v. Friedlander, 120 U. S. 707 (1887).
26. Stone, A Primer on Rent (1939) 13 TULANE L. REV. 329, 335.
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have no control whatever over the events to which legal consequences are
attached.
THE LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT 01 1939
Adopting the philosophy of the civil law under the impetus of wartime
conditions, the English have enacted the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1939.2?
Under its provisions neither the landlord nor the tenant is compelled to
rebuild or repair premises damaged as a result of war. If premises are
"unfit" by reason of enemy action, the tenant may serve on the landlord
either a notice of retainer or a notice of disclaimer. 28 If he chooses to do
the former, he becomes personally liable to execute the repairs; but he re-
tains all the remaining benefits of the lease and, in addition, is relieved of
paying rent during the period of disrepair.20 But if the tenant chooses to
disclaim the lease, the landlord then has two alternatives: (1) he may
accept the tenant's notice of disclaimer -and then the lease will be at
an end ;3o or (2) he may serve the tenant with a notice to avoid disclaimer.8 1
In the latter event, the landlord himself becomes liable for the repair of
the premises, and though the lease remains intact, the tenant again is dis-
charged from rent while the property is being restored.82 Finally, the land-
lord can force a dilatory tenant to elect one course or the other.
88
In addition, the tenant may serve a conditional notice of retention, 4 as
a consequence of the War Damage Act of 1941.85 That Act provides
for contributions to a general fund to be used to compensate owners
of land or buildings that have suffered war damage. The compensation pay-
ments will generally be in one of two forms: (1) a cost of works payment,
by which the actual cost of repairing the damage will be paid to the
landlord or to the tenant depending upon who actually undertakes the cost
of repairs ;8o (2) a value payment, which is the basis of compensation when
27. Landlord and Tenant (War Damage) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 72 (herein-
after cited by section number only). For an excellent summary, see Bicknell, The Land-
lord and Tenant (War Damage) Act, (1939) 4 CONVEY. & PRoP. LAW. 39.





33. Section 4(3). The tenant must decide within one month after the receipt of such
notice to elect. Section 5(1). If the tenant neglects to reply, he is deemed to have served
a notice to retain. Section 4(4).
34. Landlord and Tenant (War Damage) (Amendment) Act, 1941, 4 & 5 GE. VI,
c. 41, § 2 (hereinafter cited as Amendment Act). See discussion in (1941) 85 SOL. J. 574.
35. War Damage Act, 1941, 4 & 5 Gm. VI, c. 12. For a summary of the principal
provisions, see (1941) 53 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 37; Rogers, War Damage Act, 1941
(1941) 5 CONVEY. & PROP. LAW. 241. See p. 139 infra.
36. War Damage Act, 1941, GEO. VI, c. 12, §§3(2), 9(1).
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the property is a total loss or when it would be otherwise unreasonable to
carry out repairs.
3 7
Part I- Liability to Repair War Damage. The outstanding feature of
Part I of the Act is the outspoken declaration of parliamentary purpose03
that any previous covenants to repair by either party shall be ignored, and
that neither the landlord nor the tenant shall be responsible for the repair s 9
of war damage.40 This prohibition against contracting out was inserted
primarily for the benefit of the tenant, who is, in most cases, in the weaker
bargaining position. It is also frank legislative recognition of the fact that
parties to a lease may not provide for the possibility of destruction of the
premises by war action.
Despite such a clear assertion of national policy, the decision in Johstone
v. Swan Estates, Ltd.,41 indicates that judicial construction may destroy this
basic feature of the Act. In that case a clause in the lease of an eighth
floor flat provided that the lease might be determined if the flat or other
parts of the building were destroyed so as to make the flat "unfit." After
an air raid, a portion of the block was destroyed and all services interrupted,
though the tenant's particular flat was itself physically uninjured. The tenant
disclaimed under the Act of 1939, but the landlord countered with a
notice to avoid disclaimer. Then the tenant gave notice to determine
37. Id., §§3(4), 4(1)a.
38. In no less than three places is the intention of Parliament made manifest:
"Where, by virtue of the provisions (whether express or implied) of a disposition
or of any contract collateral thereto, an obligation (in this part of this Act referred to
as an 'obligation to repair') is imposed on any person to do any repairs in relation to
the land comprised in the disposition, those provisions shall be construed as not extending
to the imposition of any liability on that person to make good any war damage occurring
to the land so comprised." § 1(1).
"Any disposition or contract collateral thereto containing a provision whereurlder
an obligation to make good war damage as such is imposed on any person, shall have
effect as if that provision were not contained therein." § 1(3).
"The provisions of this Act shall have effect in relation to any war damage notwith-
standing any contract to the contrary made before that damage occurred." § 21.
39. "While the Landlord and Tenant Act does not impose on the landlord or the
tenant absolute liability to repair the premises, this does not mean that buildings which
have suffered war damage will necessarily remain unrepaired for the duration of the
war or such longer period as the owner thinks fit.
"Two Acts have been passed, namely, the Housing (Emergency) Powers Act, 1939,
and the Essential Buildings and Plant (Repair of War Damage) Act, 1939, which con-
fer wide powers on local authorities of reentering and rendering fit any building which
is unfit by reason of war damage, if the authority is satisfied that the building is re-
quired for housing purposes, or is required for some purpose essential to the welfare
of the civil population. The former Act deals with housing accommodations, the latter
with other buildings." (1939) 198 L. T. 246.
40. The term "wrr damage" should be given the broadest possible construction.
Comment, War Damage Insurance (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1160, 1166.
41. [1941] 3 All Eng. R. 446; see further (1941) 185 SoL J. 466; (1942) e6 SoL.
J. 13.
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under the clause in the lease. The court permitted this on the ground that
the section forbidding contracting-out should be narrowly construed, because
it affects contract rights. Yet the whole scheme of the statute was to substi-
tute the arrangements in the Act for all private contracts in the event of
war damage. If premises are in fact rendered "unfit," Section 4(5) appears
clearly to give the landlord an inalienable right of "requiring" a disclaiming
tenant to "retain the lease." And all special contractual powers which would
prevent the landlord from avoiding disclaimer should be rendered nugatory.
To follow the oft-quoted dicta that statutes in derogation of the common
law are to be narrowly construed would be to defeat a major parliamentary
purpose.
When the effect of war damage is to make impracticable or of no sub-
stantial benefit to the covenantee the carrying out of a covenant to repair
ordinary damage, then, under Section 1(2), the tenant (or the landlord,
depending upon who has covenanted to repair) will be relieved of even this
obligation so long as the war damage is unrepaired. The construction of
this provision is likely to raise at least one problem. Premises are often
demised under a covenant by the tenant to repair or to carry out periodic
decorations. Suppose the tenant breaches such a covenant, but, just before
the lease expires, the premises are destroyed by enemy action. Has the
landlord an action in damages against the tenant for breach of covenant?42
It must be remembered that no action will lie if the premises at the termina-
tion of the lease or shortly thereafter would be pulled down or such struc-
tural changes made as would render valueless the repairs or redecorations
covered by the covenant.43 The tenant will argue that, under Section 1(2),
he is absolved of all liability for breach of his covenant until the war damage
has been repaired and until the landlord has given him something to re-
decorate or something upon which to make repairs. The landlord will con-
tend, on the other hand, that the Act does not affect liability for damages
already incurred, which have nothing at all to do with war damage. 44 The
latter's contention would be far stronger were his claim for damages for
breach of covenant already reduced to judgment when the war damage
occurred. But under the Act as it now stands the tenant's contentions would
appear controlling. A far more satisfactory solution than is offered under
the present Act is that adopted in the Requisitioned Land Act of 1942. Under
the latter statute a court may require a tenant to pay such sums as it thinks
just in respect to decorations or repairs for which the tenant is already
liable at the time the land is requisitioned. 45
42. See discussion in (1941) 85 SOL. J. 66, 113, 116, 125.
43. Landlord and Tenant Act, 1928, 17 & 18 GEO. V, c. 36, § 1(2).
44. The same arguments might be used, though the parties would be reversed, were
the tenant to sue the landlord for compensation for good will or for an improvement of
the premises prior to their destruction by enemy action.
45. This Act is fully discussed in (1942) 86 SOL. J. 29, 71, 116, 124.
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Part II - Rights of Disclaimer in Case of War Damage. In Part II the
tenant's obligation to continue to pay rent for premises made "unfit" by the
occurrence of war damage is dealt with in detail.40 It is clear that the Act
of 1939 does not abolish the doctrine of Paradine v. Jane.7 The Act merely
gives the tenant the right to disclaim the lease if premises are made unfit,
and thereby to escape liability for rent from the date of disclaimer.4 8 The
construction of the vague term "unfit" is particularly important in deter-
mining the validity of a tenant's notice of disclaimer.
In Section 24, "unfit" is defined as follows:
"(a) in relation to buildings or works, or to land of which three
quarters or more of the value is attributable to buildings or works,
unfit for the purpose for which those buildings or works are used
or adapted for use immediately before the occurrence of the war
damage in question, having regard to the class of tenant likely to
occupy similar buildings or works which are not unfit for that pur-
pose, to the standard of accommodation available at the material
time, and to all other circumstances; and (b) in relation to other
land, unfit for any purpose for which the tenant can be reasonably
expected to use the land, having regard to the terms of the lease
under which it is held."
This definition hardly gives a judge much assistance in determining the
validity of a disclaimer.
Moreover, the construction of the standard of fitness in the Housing Acts
is of little help. Morgan v. Livcrpool Corporation, 9 involved Section 1 of
the Housing Act of 1925,50 which provided that premises be kept "reasonably
fit for human habitation." A window sash had broken and crushed the
plaintiff's hands, and, alleging a violation of the statute by the landlord, he
asked damages. Though the tenant was denied a recovery on the technical
ground that he had not notified the landlord of the faulty cord, the interpreta-
tion of the words of Section 1 by the court is significant. Lord Justice Atkin
said:" . . . while no one would say that the mere fact that one cord, or two
cords for that matter, were broken, necessarily put a house in a state in
which it is unfit for human habitation, yet when you take into consideration
46. Sections 10, 11.
47. [1647] Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897.
48. The tenant is relieved of his covenant to pay rent only if premises are rendered
"unfit." Thus, if leased property is but slightly damaged by the enemy, though the ten-
ant need not repair that damage, neither will he be relieved of paying rent, nor will lie
be permitted to disclaim the lease. In this situation it will probably be to the advantage
of both parties if they agree to share the expenses, both hoping ultimately to be indemni-
fied by the state. While it is illegal for the parties to agree as to repair of war damage
before the damage has occurred, an agreement afterwards %%ill be quite valid. A more
satisfactory solution would be to allow a proportionate abatement of the rent. See (1940)
90 L. J. 167.
49. [1927] 2 K. B. 131.
50. Housing Act, 1925, 15 Gno. V, c. 14.
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the class of house and the people with whom you are dealing and the par-
ticular circumstances of the case . . "r1 He later pointed out that, if a
house has many windows, the fact that one is broken is not important, though
the case would be quite different if a working-class house with only two
bedrooms were involved.
52
It is clear from the decisions under that Act and under the Housing Act
of 1936 53 that the standard "reasonably fit for human habitation" is a humble
one, directed primarily against slums. It is a much lower standard than
that demanded by a covenant to keep in good and tenantable repair.54 Yet
wartime standards are different from those prevailing in peacetime, and
what was not considered "fit" then may well be "reasonably fit for habi-
tation" now. In 90% of the cases, damage done by air raids is restricted
to broken windows, dislodged chimney pots, and other minor damage. 5
Whether such damage makes the premises so unfit as to permit the tenant
to disclaim would seem to depend on the proportion of windows broken,
the approach of winter, and other similar circumstances. 5 Whether mere
window breakage renders premises unfit cannot be answered abstractly, for
the importance of a window to a shop varies with the kind and class of trade
carried on.
57
Boudou v. Thornton-Smith5s involved the setting aside of a notice of dis-
claimer on the ground that the premises were not unfit when the notice was
served. The windows in the two leased shops were blown out, the ceilings
damaged, doors blown in, panelling destroyed, and door-posts twisted. At
the date of disclaimer the premises were in such a state that no business
could be carried on there. The Court found the premises "unfit" within the
meaning of the Act. Lord Justice MacKinnon admitted, however, that there
might well be a case where the amount of repairs necessary would be so small
that the maxim de minimis would apply. 9 But apart from that, he said, the
view that premises are not "unfit" because the tenant could repair them at
small cost is contrary to Section 1, which expressly provides that any obliga-
tion to repair under a lease is of no effect with regard to war damage.
A tenant may be kept out of possession while governmental authorities
are investigating an unexploded bomb in the vicinity. In this situation, it
cannot be said that the premises have been "destroyed" by enemy action,
nor, indeed, that they are "unfit" for occupation within the strict common
51. Morgan v. Liverpool Corporation, [1927] 2 K. B. 131, 145.
52. Id. at 146.
53. Housing Act, 1936, 26 GEo. V & 1 EDW. VIII, c. 51, § 2. See Summers v. Sal-
ford City Council, 57 T. L. R. 554 (C. A. 1941).
54. See (1941) 85 SOL. J. 238; (1939) 83 SOL. J. 147.
55. (1940) 84 SoL J. 591.
56. (1940) 190 L. T. 316.
57. See (1941) 85 SOL. J. 37.
58. 57 T. L. R. 387 (C. A. 1941). See (1941) 85 SOL. J. 177.
59. 57 T. L. R. at 389.
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law notion.60 The 1939 Act, moreover, may well be held inapplicable on the
ground that the tenant has merely been deprived of the personal enjoyment
of the premises, and that his leasehold interest in the land continues.61
Assuming that premises are made "unfit" by war damage, the tenant's
choice between retainer and disclaimer, since the War Damage Act of 1941,c2
is influenced by the type of compensation awarded under that Act. If a cost of
works payment is decreed, the party carrying out the repairs will be compen-
sated in full. This is a strong inducement to the tenant to retain and repair the
damage himself. But if a value payment, based upon 1939 values, is decided
upon, the tenant in all probability will wish to disclaim and look for shelter
elsewhere. Recognizing the tenant's dilemma, Parliament permits him, under
the Amendment Act, to serve a conditional notice of retention. 3 Though
the tenant is still bound to execute temporary repairs following his notice of
retention, his obligation to make complete repairs is suspended pending the
War Damage Commission's judgment. If a cost of works payment is decided
upon, the tenant must render the land fit in accordance with the rules govern-
ing a notice of retention. If a value payment is decreed, the tenant may turn
the conditional notice of retention into a notice of disclaimer. Where neither
a notice of retention nor one of disclaimer has been served, and the Com-
mission fixes upon a cost of works payment, the party liable to repair under
common law or contractual rules will be obligated to render the premises fit.
When the tenant has elected to disclaim, the landlord can either contest
the disclaimer or serve a notice to avoid disclaimer. Section 6 of the Act
recognizes that it may be arguable whether premises have actually been
rendered "unfit" by reason of war damage, and permits a notice of dis-
claimer to be contested in court on that ground. But unless the validity
of such a notice is successfully challenged in court within one month of
the date of service, the lease disclaimed will be deemed to have been sur-
rendered. 4 If the court does find the premises "unfit," it may extend the
date when a notice to avoid disclaimer may be served by the unsuccessful
challenger of the original notice.65 In both Boudou v. Thornton-SmitJh" and
60. See (1940) 84 SOL. J. 616.
61. See Matthey v. Curling, [1922] 2 A. C. 180; Whitehall Court, Ltd. v. Ettlinger,
[1920] 1 K. B. 680; London and Northern Estates Co. v. Schlesinger, [1916] 1 K. B. 20.
In these cases the tenant vwas held liable for rent even though the premises had bcn
requisitioned by the government. Sir Donald Somervell, K. C. (answering a question
put to the Attorney General) said that the provisions of the Act of 1939 did not apply
to the case where a time bomb compelled a tenant to evacuate his premises temporarily.
(1940) 84 So J. 638. But see police court decision, suspending a weekly tenant's rent
under such circumstances. (1940) 90 L. J. 161.
62. War Damage Act, 1941, 4 & 5 Gao. VI, c. 12.
63. Amendment Act, § 2.
64. Section 6(1).
65. Section 6(4).
66. 57 T. L. R. 387 (C. A. 1941).
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Cooper v. Jax Stores, Ltd.,67 the landlord did not agree that the premises
were so "unfit" as to permit disclaimer. The landlord in each case countered
with a notice to avoid disclaimer, and then also applied to the court to void
the tenant's disclaimer on the ground that the premises were not "unfit."
It was held that by serving a notice to avoid disclaimer a landlord once
and for all decides not to start any controversy about the unfitness of the
premises. Thus the proper procedure is for the landlord to attack the "unfit-
ness" point first, failing which he may serve a notice to avoid disclaimer-
but not vice versa!
But what of the tenant who serves an unchallenged notice of disclaimer
yet continues to occupy the premises? In a recently decided case,08 defendant
lessees remained in occupation several months after serving a notice of dis-
claimer, for which period they refused to pay any more than a token amount
of rent even though their business had been beneficially carried on during
that time. The court held that once there is a valid disclaimer, a tenant
remaining in possession is a tenant by sufferance and liable for a substantial
amount of rent- liable, in fact, for the same amount he would be required
to pay as mesne profits if he were deemed a trespasser.
Because of the awkward notice provisions of the Act, an uncooperative
tenant, by dilatory tactics, can make it extremely difficult for the landlord
to regain possession of his property. To begin with, if tht tenant does
nothing following the occurrence of war damage, the landlord must wait
a reasonable time before serving a notice to elect. 69 If the tenant does not
reply within the prescribed period of one month, he is deemed to have
retained, 70 and there is then an implied covenant on his part to make the
premises fit within a reasonable time.71 If the tenant, nevertheless, does not
repair the war damage, the landlord must wait (without rent) until a
reasonable time elapses before applying to the court for a restoration of
rent.72 Finally, there is an additional period of delay before the landlord
can serve a notice under the clumsy procedure of the Law of Property Act
of 1925, 73 and then begin an action in ejectment. 74 A slightly less burden-
some procedure for repossession is available to the landlord in the case of
weekly or short tenancies. Under Section 1(6) of the Amendment Act of
1941, a court can determine a short tenancy on the landlord's application.
The land must be presently fit and have been rendered such within the past
three months, during which time the tenant must neither have been in occu-
67. 57 T. L. R. 401 (C. A. 1941).





73. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 GEO. VI, c. 20, § 146(1).
74. Rogers, Some Anomalies of the Landlord and Tenant (War Damage) Act, 1939
(1940) 4 Com=vY. & PROP. LAW. 234, 248.
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pation nor have paid rent and the landlord must have made reasonable
efforts to communicate with the tenant. In either type of tenancy, if there is a
reentry clause providing that the landlord can reenter upon breach of a
covenant by the tenant, the landlord conceivably can reenter upon breach
of the implied covenant by the tenant to reinstate the property as soon as
possible following a notice of retention or a notice to avoid disclaimer.3
But the landlord's immediate statutory remedy for breach of this implied
covenant is an appeal to a court for the restoration of rent.70 Unfortunately
there is no similarly express provision for the tenant if the landlord fails
to repair promptly.77 A more satisfactory solution would be to permit the
court to award damages on application by the aggrieved party.
The technicalities of these complicated notice provisions"8 have given rise to
considerable litigation. In Price v. Mann" a landlord's notice to avoid dis-
claimer was ambiguous in that it referred to the wrong section of the Act
as authority for serving such a notice.80 The notice, however, was held
effective, the court agreeing with the plaintiff that notices need not be such as
to satisfy the hypercritical,8L and that the tenant on reading the notice as
a whole could not possibly have been misled. In Black v. Milcham the
court went even further. There a letter written by a "bombed out" tenant,
enclosing the keys to the premises, was held a valid notice of disclaimer
though there was no reference to the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1939,
no mention of the word disclaimer, and no allusion to war damage.
The Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act of 19 4183 dispenses with
all notices of disclaimer, retention, or election if property held under weeldy
and other "short tenancies" is made unfit by war damage.8 4 This provision
75. See (1942) 86 SOL. J. 26.
76. Section 10(1)d. In the case of a short tenancy, however, the landlurd %% ill un-
doubtedily invoke § 1(6) of the Amendment Act.
77. See (1941) 85 SoL. J. 185.
78. The only substantial merit of these notices, says P. H. Thorold Rogers, is "that
in the event of air raids on a large scale there will be enough work to keep every solicitor
in the damaged district busy serving notices and counter notices for weeks after the
damage has been caused." Rogers, supra note 74, at 234.
79. [1942] 1 All Eng. R. 62 (K. B.); see discussion in (1942) 86 SoL. J. 59, 252.
80. Section 10 was referred to instead of § 11.
81. Compare notice provisions of The Requisitioned Land Act, 1942, discu cl in
(1942) 86 SoL. J. 129.
82. [1941] 5 All Eng. R. 269; see also (1941) 85 So.. J. 414, 424; (1942) 8 S,,.
J. 59.
83. For a summary of the main provisions, see (1941) 85 Sot. J. 236.
84. Amendment Act, § 1(1). "Short tenancies" are defined in § 1(10) as "any
tenancy or sub-tenancy which the tenant is entitled to determine at any time by a notice
expiring not later than the end of the next complete period of three months of the ten-
ancy, and, in a case where a person is holding over any land, which he previously held
under a short tenancy, by virtue of the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Acts,
1920 to 1939, the Courts (Emergency Powers) Acts, 1939 to 1941, or the Uabilities
(War Time Adjustment) Act, 1941, he shall be deened to be holding the land under
a short tenancy."
1942]
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was directed at the class of tenants which has long outnumbered other
classes- the poorer tenants who can not be expected to be aware of their
rights regarding notices.85 The new Act automatically suspends rent so long
as such premises remain unoccupied ;86 if there is partial occupation, the
rent is apportioned.
87
Part 11-Multiple Leases. The differential treatment of multiple leases
in Part III of the Act requires the development of criteria of severability
for separate or subdivided premises under one lease. As defined in Section
24, multiple leases include all those "comprising buildings which are used
or adapted for use as two or more separate tenements." Disclaimer of one
or more of the respective tenements is permitted (if found unfit), and the
rent is then apportioned for the remaining undisclaimed tenements.88 This
portion of the statute contemplates cases in which separate but self-contained
buildings have been let by one lease, and also cases in which premises have
been subdivided and the subdivisions sublet.89 The language used in the
definition- " . . . lease comprising buildings which are used . . . . " - is
somewhat ambiguous. Parliament certainly did not mean that, in order to
qualify as a multiple-lease tenant, a tenant had to own at least two blocks
of flats or offices. A court might easily avoid such a strict interpretation
by regarding the several flats or sets of offices as so many buildings, each
a "separate tenement." 0°
Two important cases have laid down certain factual criteria for determining
what constitutes a multiple lease. In Herrmann v. Metropolitan Co., Ltd.,91
a lease comprised two adjoining but separate buildings. The tenant used
both buildings in the course of manufacturing a single article and contended
that the lease was, theref6re, not a multiple lease. The court held, however,
that premises are "adapted for use" as two or more tenements if reasonably
suitable for such use in the ordinary course of business, no matter how the
premises are actually used. The corollary of the Herrmann doctrine is found
in Westminster Bank, Ltd. v. Edwards.92 There a lessor had leased two
separate buildings to a head-lessee, and the head-lessee had subleased several
floors to various parties. One of the floors was destroyed, and that tenant
85. See (1941) 85 SOL. J. 236, 260. The rent book is a distinguishing feature of week-
ly tenancies.
86. Amendment Act, § 1(2).
87. Id., § 1 (3) : ". . . there shall be payable by the tenant in respect of the period
of such occupation such rent as may be agreed between him and the landlord or, in de-
fault of agreement, as may be fixed by the court."
88. Section 15(4).
89. See (1942) 86 SOL. J. 40.
90. See (1941) 85 SoL. 3. 246. An additional argument could be based on the phras-
ing of § 1(1)16 of the Interpretation Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vicr., c. 65: "Words in the sin-
gular shall include the plural, and words in the plural shall include the singular."
91. 58 T. L. R. 145 (Ch. 1942).
92. [19423 1 All Eng. R. 470 (H. L.).
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disclaimed to his immediate landlord, the head-lessee. The head-lessee then
attempted to disclaim all of the lease covering the two buildings, but his
landlord, the head-lessor, maintained that only that part of the lease (one
floor) which was destroyed was disclaimable. The court agreed with the
head-lessor that the lease was a multiple lease, because the premises were
in fact used as separate tenements. Apparently, then, the lease of a single
hereditament becomes a "multiple lease" if the tenant sublets portions of
that which was let to him as a whole, so long as there is no covenant to the
contrary in the lease.
93
Ground Leases. In ground leases0 4 the owner makes long-term leases of
plots of vacant land to builders who undertake, in consideration of low
rentals, to erect houses upon them;95 and the owner retains the reversion to
the buildings. Because such builders, ground lessees, do not need much
protection, the Act of 1939 gave them fewer rights to disclaim than it gave
to the usual type of tenant. Ground lessees were not permitted to disclaim
without leave of court,06 and the court before allowing disclaimer was to
regard all the circumstances of the case- length of unexpired term, offers
by lessor to extend the term or to modify the rent, extent of war damage
suffered, etc.97 If the court refused to allow disclaimer, the ground lessee
did not have to make good the damage; but, unlike the ordinary tenant
denied disclaimer, he could not avail himself of the advantages of a notice
of retention, foremost of which is a suspension of rent until the repairs
are completed. 8
In spite of the persuasive reasons for distinguishing betveen ground and
ordinary leases, the Amendment Act of 1941 eliminated the special procedure
for ground leases, and they are now to be treated as other leases. 3 Hence-
forth a contract to hand over buildings to a ground landlord at the end of
one hundred years is determinable when buildings are destroyed by the
enemy, notwithstanding the fact that the yearly rental was based on the land,
which still exists, rather than on the buildings. Thus, besides losing, for
the time being, the value of the reversion to the buildings, the ground land-
93. See (1942) 86 SoL. J. 102, 232.
94. In § 24 a "ground lease" is defined as "a lease at a rent (or, where the rent
varies, at a maximum rent) which does not substantially exceed the rent which a tenant
might reasonably have been expected, at the commencement of the term created by the
lease, to pay for the land comprised in the lease, excluding any buildings, for a term
equal to the term created by the lease."
95. "At common law the relationship between the owner of a ground lease and the
'ground landlord' was exactly the same as that between a weekly tenant and his land-
lord." (1941) 85 Sot- J. 246.
96. Section 13 (2).
97. Section 13(3).
98. Section 13(2). See discussion in (1940) 84 SuL. J. 71.
99. Amendment Act, § 10(1).
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lord must now find a new tenant for the plot and begin over again.100 It has
been suggested that no rent be payable until the buildings are reconstructed
at the end of the War, after the state has awarded war damage compensation,
and that then the remaining number of years be added at the other end of
the lease period. 1' 1 But since the ground landlord, like all others having
interests in land, will eventually obtain a compensatory share proportionate
to the loss in the value of his interest,102 and since he still has the ground,
any such extra privileges would appear wholly undeserved.
The Position of the Mortgagee. Of special interest is the position of the
mortgagee of leased premises.103 It is very common for a mortgage deed to
contain a covenant that the mortgagor will keep the premises in repair. Oth-
erwise the mortgagee's security would be greatly prejudiced. 0 4 But because
of Section 1 of the Act, such a covenant will not extend to the repair of
war damage. In some quarters, however, it is insisted that the mortgagee
may restore war-damaged property and add the expense incurred to the mort-
gage debt.105 This would be an indirect contravention of Section 1 and cer-
tainly should not be permitted. A similar problem is raised when the mort-
gagee considers it necessary for a surveyor to inspect the war damage.
100
The surveyor's fees should not be added to the mortgage debt on the basis of
"just allowances." Rather the debt should be borne by the mortgagee, for
the inspection is for his benefit.
When the mortgagor's obligation to repair has been extinguished, any rights
of the mortgagee arising from breach of such a covenant -most important
of which is the right of foreclosure- will also be extinguished.10 7 And if
the tenant-mortgagor disclaims, all interests in the term created by the dis-
claimed lease, including the mortgagee's interest, are deemed to have been ex-
tinguished.' 08 This is the real fear of the mortgagee- that the security for
his principal moneys, interest, and costs will be wiped out by the tenant's
disclaimer. There are but two escapes available to the mortgagee: (1) appli-
cation to a court to determine whether the property is really "unfit" ;100 or
(2) application to a court, under Section 9, to modify the effect of the
tenant-mortgagor's notice of disclaimer and to get the lease vested in himself.
But this latter procedure would not generally be advisable, since the mort-
100. See (1941) 85 SOL. J. 301.
101. See (1941) 85 SOL. J. 317.
102. War Damage Act, 1941, 4 & 5 Grio. VI, c. 12, § 9(2).
103. See generally Walford, The War and Mortgages (1940) 5 CoNvvy. & PRoP,
LAW. 139; (1942) 193 L. T. 5; (1940) 90 L. J. 209; (1940) 89 SOL. J. 629.
104. See (1940) 84 SOL. 3. 628.
105. See (1940) 90 L. J. 193.
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gagee probably would not want to be saddled with the burdens and liabilities
of the lessee.
Now, however, that the elaborate insurance provisions of the War Damage
Act of 1941 are in effect, the mortgagee's choice of action will largely depend
upon the award of the War Damage Commission. If the tenant disclaims, the
lease will be determined and the mortgage interest with it.",, If then the
Commission decides upon a cost of works paynent, the mortgagee will get
nothing, since payment goes to the person who incurs the expense of re-
pairs."' Thus, where a mortgagee anticipates a cost of works payment, he
must seriously consider whether he should apply to have the lease vested in
him. On the other hand, if the Commission decrees a value payment,1 -' the
mortgagee will not be adversely affected whether the lease is vested in him
or not. The amount of compensation paid by the government will be appor-
tioned between the respective owners of the proprietary interests in the land
in proportion to the amount of depreciation each interest has suffered.213
The mortgagee, because he stands in the shoes of the tenant, will, therefore,
be entitled to a proportionate share of the value payment.
1 14
The mortgagee is, however, not wholly at the mercy of the disclaiming
tenant. When war damage has occurred, the tenant-mortgagor must notify
the mortgagee of its general nature and permit him to inspect the damage
and to repair it, either temporarily or permanently, if he wishes. 1"0 But the
mortgagee may not enforce any rights arising out of a breach of the legally
imposed duty to notify, and to permit inspection and/or repair, except with
leave of court."" Of additional advantage to the mortgagee is the require-
ment, under Section 7, that notice of disclaimer include the fact that a mort-
gage exists, with the name and address of the mortgagee or his successor in
title. The mortgagee also is made aware of the intended disclaimer of the
lease, for within seven days of the service of disclaimer the mortgagor must
notify the mortgagee of the fact of disclaimer. If the mortgagee is damaged
by failure of such notice - i.c., by being deprived of an opportunity to
apply to a court for modification of the notice of disclaimer -the person
responsible will be liable to make good the damage to the mortgagee.
117
Mfscellaneous Problems. The provision in the Act regarding agricultural
and mining leases is a model of simplicity which unfortunately the rest of
110. Section 8(2).
111. War Damage Act, 1941, 4 & 5 GEo. VI, c. 12, § 9(1).
112. The basis for decreeing a value payment is that it would be unprufitable tj
restore the property. Rogers, War Damage Act, 1941 (1941) 5 Cozvy. & Pnop. LAw.
241, 257.
113. War Damage Act, 1941, 4 & 5 Gao. VI, c. 12, §§ 9(2), (3).
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the Act does not follow." 8 Yet here, too, the draftsmen have allowed an
ambiguity. If buildings or works comprised in an agricultural or mining
lease are unfit by reason of war damage, the tenant may apply to a court,
which has discretion either to determine the lease or modify its terms, by
reducing the rent or otherwise. 119 But it is not clear whether disclaimer will
be permitted in the case of a large-scale gas attack which renders agricultural
land useless for some time.
120
Perplexing questions, involving the jurisdictional and definitive sections
of the statute, are also certain to arise in the near future. What is an inter-
est in land, for example? Does the right to maintain billboards on land for
advertising purposes, or the right to erect electric signs on the walls of build-
ings, or even the right of a stallholder in a restaurant, theatre, or railway
station, create any interest in land for the grantee? 121 Who is a tenant? 122
And who is a landlord? In the case of Hildebrand v. Lewis'2 3 the court
had to decide who was a "landlord" within the meaning of Section 24 of the
Act. A subtenant, obliged to pay rent to the head landlord because the tenant
was in arrears, served a notice of disclaimer. The head landlord thereupon
served a notice to avoid disclaimer on the subtenant. Because the head land-
lord was not, under the lease, entitled to rent from the subtenant, the for-
mer's notice to avoid disclaimer was denied effect.
Happily for the tenant, one of the most annoying problems to arise tinder
the 1939 Act- the tenant's right, following a notice of disclaimer, to regain
rent paid in advance 124 has now been resolved. The Amendment Act of
1941 makes rent paid in advance apportionable, and any part paid for a
period subsequent to the notice of disclaimer is returnable to the tenant,'2u
Finally, there is some doubt, in view of the provisions of the Act holding
neither party responsible for the repair of war damage, as to the disposal of
a suit in tort brought against the landlord by tenants and occupiers of flats
118. See Rogers, Some Anomalies of the Landlord and Tcnant (War Damage) Act,
1939 (1940) 3 ConvEY. & PaoP. LAW. 234; (1939) 83 SOL. J. 759, 775.
119. Section 19.
120. Rogers, supra note 118, at 242.
121. Id. at 238.
122. See (1942) 193 L. T. 99.
123. [1941] 2 K. B. 135; see also (1941) 86 SoL. J. 276.
124. In Turner v. Stella Bond, Ltd., [1941] 1 K. B. 569, it was held that a tenant
who had not yet paid his rent in advance was not liable for rent after the date of dis-
claimer. See (1942) 193 L. T. 36. But in Hildebrand v. Lewis, [1941] 2 K. B. 135, the
punctual tenant was unable to recover rent for the period after disclaimer. The so-called
Coronation cases (typical is Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K. B. 740) had held that one
could not recover money paid in advance for a seat to view the coronation procession,
though the procession had been called off. By analogy it was argued that a lease was
not determined by the occurrence of war damage, but that the parties were merely re-
leased from its further performance.
125. Amendment Act, § 13. But this Act is not retroactive. See London Fan and
Motor Co., Ltd. v. Silverman, 58 T. L. R. 119 (K. B. 1942).
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or third parties injured in consequence of unrepaired war damage after the
landlord has had notice and time to repair it. Several commentators agree
that the Act of 1939 will be no bar to a recovery in tort by the tenant.! 0
As regards innocent third parties, it was laid down in Wringe v. Cohen 127
that the landlord is liable to passers-by and adjoining owners for a nuisance
caused by trespassers (German airmen) if: (1) he is responsible for re-
pairs; and (2) with knowledge or means of knowledge he allows the danger
to continue. In Cushing v. Peter Walker & Son x' 8 suit was brought
by an innocent pedestrian injured by a slate which fell from the r,,of of a
flat that had been damaged ten days earlier by enemy action. The defend-
ants (the owners as well as occupiers) escaped liability only because reason-
able examination of the roof by them had not disclosed any loosening of the
slates. Thus it would seem that a landlord, even one who has evacuated
to the country, will remain liable for patent nuisances caused by bombing
raids if he has had actual notice of bombings in the vicinity, and probably
even if he has no such knowledge, since it would be his duty to anticipate
the possibility and to make inquiries.
But the effect of these cases may well be changed in the light of the \\ ar
Damage Act of 1941. If the War Damage Commission determines upon a
cost of works payment, it would seem that the party undertaking the repairs,
either landlord or tenant, will be liable in tort to third parties for injuries
caused to persons or property while the premises remain unrepaired.'2
A POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES
The lesson for the United States to learn from England's war time epe-
rience is readily apparent. Because the various state rules are in utter con-
fusion, a Congressional act relieving tenants from liability to rebuild and
to pay rent for destroyed premises is imperative. Since the probability of
large-scale destruction of property by enemy action is at present quite re-
mote, a scheme of free indemnity insurance 110 should be established by the
national government. The English plan of two types of compensation for war
damage is a good one; certainly, for obvious social reasons, not all property
destroyed by war should be reconstructed.131 But, because the awards here
126. Blundel, Liabilities of Landlord and Tenant in Respect of Non-repair, -utis nce
and Dangerous Premises (1940) 5 Cozrvnv. & Paop. LAw. 100; (1942) 93 L. J. 16);
(1940) 84 SOL. J. 665.
127. [1940] 1 K B. 229.
128. [1941] 2 All Eng. R. 693.
129. War Damage Act, 1941, 4 & 5 Gao. VI, c. 12, § 5.
130. See Comment, War Damage Insurance (1942) 51 YAI. L. J. llco, 1164-1165.
131. Any person erecuting repairs to property suffering from war damage in e.xcess
of £100 must inform the War Damage Commission. The Commission vill in turn cin-
suit local planning authorities to ascertain whether the carrying out of the proroei41
works will conform with their intentions regarding replanning and other public interests.
See (1942) 86 Sos. J. 81, 108, 118.
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will not be on such a large scale as in England, there is no necessity to wait
until after the war to make these payments. If, for inflationary reasons,
it is not advisable to pay the parties in cash, war bonds might be issued as
payment.
A War Damage Commission, with regional boards in the important cities
on the vulnerable East and West Coasts, should be appointed. The Com-
mission should have large discretionary powers to determine whether premises
are "unfit," whether notices have been given within a reasonable time, etc.,
but an appeal from its decisions to the courts should be permitted. 1 2
If premises are made "unfit," and the Commission awards a value
payment, the lease should be declared at an end, and the parties in interest
paid off immediately. If a cost of works payment is decided upon, the War
Damage Commission should assume responsibility for making, and paying
for, the repairs. This departure from the English procedure would eliminate
any claim by either party that the repairs have not been made promptly.1 0
The tenant, of course, should not be held liable for rent during the period
of disrepair. 134 But the landlord should not be compensated for loss of rent
during this period because such loss, like that of business profits, is in the
nature of consequential damage which the usual insurance policy never
covers.'3 5 When the repairs have been completed, the Commission should
notify the tenant that he may reenter and that the landlord may again claim
rent.
132. For criticism of the British scheme, under which the Act is administered by the
county courts, see (1941) 191 L. J. 94; (1940) 84 Sol J. 629.
133. Under the British plan, a certificate of fitness is issued by the local housing
authority when the repairs have been completed. If more materials become available
later, the standard on which this certificate was given may cease to be a reasonable
standard of fitness. On application by the injured party the certificate of fitness may be
withdrawn. See further (1941) 85 SOL. J. 301.
134. The following war clause was adopted by the Real Estate Board of New York
in June, f941, for inclusion in all its standard leases: "This lease and the obligation of
Tenant to pay rent hereunder and perform all of the other covenants and agreements
hereunder on part of Tenant to be performed shall in nowise be affected, impaired or
excused because Landlord is unable to supply or is delayed in supplying any service ex-
pressly or impliedly to be supplied or is unable to make, or is delayed in making any
repairs, additions, alterations or decorations or is unable to supply or is delayed in sup-
plying any equipment or fixtures if Landlord is prevented or delayed from so doing by
reason of governmental preemption in connection with the National Emergency declared
by the President of the United States or in connection with any rule, order or regulation
of any department or subdivision thereof of any governmental agency or by reason of
the conditions of supply and demand which have been or are affected by the war." The
newspaper PM commented on this clause (Aug. 22, 1942, p. 19): "The legal language
clause means in plain English, that landlords, by blaming the National Emergency, can
delay repairs and curtail all services to tenants, who, nevertheless, are required to con-
tinue to pay full rent. It means that a broken water pipe can continue to leak; that plas-
ter can continue to fall; that rat holes can't be sealed; that window panes can't be re-
placed; that steam heat can be cut out. It can mean anything."
135. See Comment, War Damage Insurance (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1160, 1167.
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Weekly and short tenancies should be disclaimable at the tenant's option.
The Commission should be obliged to notify all such tenants at what date re-
pairs will be completed and repossession allowed. Some time prior to that
date, all tenants wishing to resume their tenancy would have so to signify,
under penalty that the landlord might let to other parties. But, contrary to
the British policy, tenancies longer than short tenancies should not be dis-
claimable in view of the fact that the Commission, by making the repairs,
restores the parties to their respective positions before the occurrence of
the damage.
The landlord, as the more economically interested party, should have the
burden of informing the Commission of the occurrence of war damage. But
the tenant should also have the privilege of informing the Commission to
the same effect. In this way, the complexities of the notice provisions of
the British Act would be eliminated.
If only slight damage has occurred,.'3 the Commission should be notified
as in the case of complete destruction, and that body should then abate the
tenant's rent accordingly. The landlord should be responsible for slight re-
pairs and should receive compensation upon their completion out of the
funds of the Commission.
CONCLUSION
The major premise of this emergency legislation- that neither the
landlord nor the tenant should be responsible for the repair of war damage
-is a sound one. And the provisos absolving the tenant from rent and permit-
ting him to disclaim the lease completely if premises are made "unfit" are
eminently just and reasonable. But above and beyond its emergency signifi-
cance, such legislative departure from common law precedents may well be
expected to have a far-reaching effect even after the War.37 For a court,
asked to determine a tenant's liability to pay rent and to rebuild if leased
premises are destroyed by lightning or flood or any other Act of God- the
traditional type of case in which the common law rule is applied -vi un-
doubtedly hesitate before drawing a distinction between such damage and
damage done by the public enemy. In neither situation is the destructive force
foreseen, nor is it within the control of the parties at the time of signing
the lease.
136. Due to high administrative costs, no payment is made under the British NVar
Damage Act where the amount of damage is less than L5. The smaller the claim allowed,
the more difficult it is to decide whether the damage is due to the war or to mere wear
and tear. See (1941) 85 SOL. J. 51.
137. But the absence of insurance on leased property vill also be a factor to bU con-
sidered in predicting the future climate of judicial opinion.
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